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L’Équipe questions whether the Emirates has delivered promised Arsenal cash windfall

L’Équipe questions whether the Emirates has delivered promised Arsenal cash windfall
L’Équipe questions whether the Emirates has delivered promised Arsenal cash windfall

According to L’Équipe, Arsenal’s move to the Emirates Stadium in 2006 hasn’t delivered the financial boost once envisioned by Arsène Wenger and the club’s hierarchy.

The Emirates not so cash Legacy of the Wenger years, which amortized the debt, the Emirates Stadium brings Arsenal € 132 million per year. Twice as much as the TV rights and much less than the commercial income. L'Équipe30 Sep 2024 The statue of Arsene Wenger lifting the Premier League trophy has been erected since the summer of 2023 in front of the Emirates Stadium. For a long time, Arsène Wenger and the Arsenal managers thought that the short move from Highbury to the Emirates, from the historic and cramped stadium with 38,000 seats to this modern arena with 60,000 seats, in 2006, would allow the Gunners to play in the same financial courtyard as their Premier League rivals, irrigated by foreign funds that sometimes seemed unlimited. Eighteen years later, the case is not so obvious, even if the "match day" revenues (*) have never been as significant as in 20232024 (€ 132M), under the effect of the return of the Champions League, a 5% increase in the price of seats, and remunerative tours. But they are far from TV rights (€281 million) and commercial revenues (€227 MILLION). Between 2004 and 2011, from Highbury to the Emirates, the income linked to the stadium had tripled, to reach € 111M, but the debt linked to the construction will have caused a long austerity. These revenues have stabilized so much since then that Josh Kroenke, co-chairman with Stan Kroenke, owner who is none other than his father, recently confessed to "internal conversations" on the subject of expansion and renovation. By building this stadium for € 450 million and going into debt for two thirds of the sum, starting in 2004, Arsenal will have plunged part of the Wenger years (19962018) into austerity, since it took until 2013 and the transfer of Mesut Özil (€ 50M, from Real Madrid) to see the club invest heavily in the market. It was the Alsatian technician, involved in all the details of the construction of the stadium as well as the Colney training center, who paid for the stadium, little by little, forced in equal parts by his nature and by his superiors to a virtuous management, which had to be self-sufficient. This management is quite easily measurable: during his era, the negative balance of transfers will have been € 291 million, while it has amounted to € 916 million since, in just six seasons. Apart from in 2002 (€ 20 million in losses), Wenger's Arsenal has always made a profit after taxes (€ 64 million in 2017-2018, his last season), at the height of the repayment of the stadium debt; since his departure, the London club has closed each season with losses, in a range of € 30 to € 120 million. Over the last five years, the Gunners have posted €360 million in losses, covered by low-interest loans from its shareholder, KSE, and by Barclays (€84 MILLION). After some of the observers mocked the "Arsène Wenger Cup" for a long time, which consisted of considering the top 4 and qualification for the Champions League as a victory, Losses at the end of every season since Wenger's departure it is obvious, today, that Arsenal needs to compete in the C1 every year, and that the Emirates has not really allowed the club, over the long term, to reach an important milestone in its revenues. Over the last three seasons, the London club has spent almost € 540M on transfers. Even considering the depreciation and resale of players, the "match day" revenues have no chance of significantly reducing the rating. Especially since size is not everything: in 20222023, according to Deloitte, PSG had the second highest matchday income in Europe (€ 153 million), just behind Barcelona (€ 166 MILLION), with a stadium twice as small. (*) Including in particular the receipts of ticketing, hospitality and merchandising in the official shops around a meeting.

While the club’s matchday revenue reached a record €132 million in the 2023-24 season, thanks to the return of Champions League football, a five percent ticket price increase, and lucrative pre-season tours, L’Équipe reports that this figure is still overshadowed by the club’s TV rights income (€281 million) and commercial revenues (€227 million).

L’Équipe highlights that Arsenal’s intention in leaving the 38,000-seat Highbury for the 60,000-seat Emirates was to elevate the club to the financial levels of their Premier League rivals, many of whom benefit from foreign investment.

However, they argue that nearly two decades later, this hasn’t materialised as clearly as hoped.

The financial reality of the Emirates move

LONDON - OCTOBER 5: Manager Arsene Wenger of Arsenal poses outside Arsenal Football Club's new Emirates Stadium development at Ashburton Grove on October 5, 2004 in London. Arsenal have just announced the stadium will be called the Emirates Stadium for the next fifteen years after signing a new sponsorship deal with Emirates. (Photo by Paul Gilham/Getty Images)

L’Équipe points out that between 2004 and 2011, Arsenal’s stadium income tripled, peaking at €111 million.

Despite this boost, the €450 million cost of the Emirates, financed with two-thirds of the amount through debt, led to a period of austerity at the club.

This financial strain meant that Wenger, who was deeply involved in the construction process of both the Emirates and the Colney training centre, had to operate under a tight budget for many years, as we are all-too aware.

Arsenal’s heavy debt load meant that Wenger’s transfer spending was severely restricted until the 2013 signing of Mesut Özil from Real Madrid for €50 million.

L’Équipe stresses how Wenger’s frugal management was key to keeping the club afloat during this period. Throughout his tenure from 1996 to 2018, Arsenal’s negative transfer balance stood at just €291 million.

By contrast, in the six seasons since Wenger’s departure, Arsenal’s net transfer spending has soared to €916 million, signalling a drastic shift in spending behaviour.

Despite these financial challenges, Wenger’s Arsenal consistently turned a profit, recording a €64 million surplus in his final season.

Since his exit, however, L’Équipe notes that the club has reported losses ranging from €30 to €120 million each season, totalling €360 million over the last five years.

Emirates expansion discussions and the need for Champions League football

LONDON, ENGLAND - MARCH 12: David Raya of Arsenal makes the match-winning save from the fourth penalty from Galeno of FC Porto (not pictured) in the penalty shoot out during the UEFA Champions League 2023/24 round of 16 second leg match between Arsenal FC and FC Porto at Emirates Stadium on March 12, 2024 in London, England. (Photo by Shaun Botterill/Getty Images)

L’Équipe reveals that Josh Kroenke, Arsenal’s co-chairman, has acknowledged internal discussions regarding the expansion and renovation of the Emirates, indicating that the club recognises its need to maximise matchday revenue further.

The report stresses that this consideration reflects how Arsenal’s ambitions have shifted over the years. As L’Équipe emphasises, Arsenal’s financial health is increasingly tied to their participation in the Champions League, making it crucial for the club to secure a top-four finish each season.

Spending big in a quest for success

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND - SEPTEMBER 22: Riccardo Calafiori of Arsenal looks on during the Premier League match between Manchester City FC and Arsenal FC at Etihad Stadium on September 22, 2024 in Manchester, England. (Photo by Michael Regan/Getty Images)
MANCHESTER, ENGLAND – SEPTEMBER 22: Riccardo Calafiori of Arsenal looks on during the Premier League match between Manchester City FC and Arsenal FC at Etihad Stadium on September 22, 2024 in Manchester, England. (Photo by Michael Regan/Getty Images)

Over the last three seasons, Arsenal has invested nearly €540 million in the transfer market. Yet, L’Équipe notes that with such spending, matchday revenues alone cannot cover the club’s outlays, especially when considering the depreciation and resale of players.

The report suggests that the Emirates, contrary to original expectations, hasn’t enabled Arsenal to bridge the financial gap with Europe’s elite clubs over the long term.

L’Équipe further points out that matchday revenue isn’t solely dependent on stadium size, citing the example of Paris Saint-Germain. Despite playing in the smaller Parc des Princes, PSG generated €153 million in matchday income in the 2022-23 season, second only to Barcelona’s €166 million.

Conclusion: the Emirates hasn’t delivered as promised

LONDON, ENGLAND - FEBRUARY 11: A general view outside of the Remember Who You Are stadium wrap prior to the Premier League match between Arsenal FC and Brentford FC at Emirates Stadium on February 11, 2023 in London, England. (Photo by Clive Mason/Getty Images)
LONDON, ENGLAND – FEBRUARY 11: A general view outside of the Remember Who You Are stadium wrap prior to the Premier League match between Arsenal FC and Brentford FC at Emirates Stadium on February 11, 2023 in London, England. (Photo by Clive Mason/Getty Images)

Ultimately, L’Équipe argues that while the Emirates has increased Arsenal’s matchday revenue, it hasn’t delivered the significant financial leap anticipated.

The stadium’s financial legacy remains complex, as the club’s spending and reliance on external revenues have grown significantly.

The return of Champions League football is a positive step, but L’Équipe concludes that Arsenal is still searching for the full financial windfall that moving to the Emirates was supposed to bring.