The Eskimos’ decision to kick a field goal on third-and-inches almost came back to bite them

Friday night's CFL game between the Edmonton Eskimos and Hamilton Tiger-Cats was perhaps the most thrilling of the season so far, featuring plenty of back-and-forth play, lead changes, and even a final drive that saw Hamilton stopped inside the five-yard line. However, with one different decision from Edmonton head coach Chris Jones, the Eskimos might have won this one much more comfortably. On Edmonton's final drive, with his team up 25-24 and the ball on the Tiger-Cats' eight-yard line, Jones elected to kick a 15-yard field goal when facing a third-and-inches. That led to Hamilton getting the ball back on their own 35 with a chance to win, and they made it inside the Eskimos' five before being stopped. Kicking the field goal worked out in the end, but going for it might have been the smarter move.

The argument for the field goal is that doing so meant Hamilton needed a touchdown to win instead of a field goal, and that's a valid point. However, there were only 48 seconds left when Edmonton kicked the field goal. If the Eskimos had gone for the first down instead and succeeded, that should have let them kill the remaining clock with kneeldowns. (There's a 20-second play clock in the CFL, and the clock should start when the ball's ready to be snapped when the previous play was a run or a completed pass. If Hamilton had had two timeouts remaining, they could have gotten the ball back even after an Edmonton first down, but they had already used at least one, so kneeldowns should have killed it.) Both moves in this situation carry a pretty good chance of winning for Edmonton, of course, but it seems quite likely their chances might have been even better with a more aggressive third-down approach.

What are the odds of a successful conversion here? From a study Rob Pettapiece conducted in 2013 based on data from 2008-2012, CFL teams' success rate going for it on third-and-inches plays was 92 per cent. If the Eskimos had made that conversion, they should have been able to run out the clock; we'll give them a 99 per cent chance of doing that, as you can never completely rule out a screwup along the lines of the Miracle at the Meadowlands. Thus, their probability of winning by going for it would be the probability of converting that third down multiplied by the probability of successfully kneeling down; 0.92 * 0.99 = 0.9108, or 91 per cent.

It's worth noting that things could have worked out well for the Eskimos even in the eight per cent of situations where they went for it and didn't convert, too (or the one per cent or less where they convert and then fumble on a kneeldown). That gives Hamilton the ball on their own eight. Yes, they could tie with a rouge or win with a field goal, but they'd have to drive about 60 yards to get into range for a 50-yard field goal attempt (or further for a more reasonable field goal attempt), which isn't all that different from having to drive 75 yards (from their own 35) for a touchdown following Edmonton's field goal. Defending a 60-plus-yard drive for field goal range isn't much harder than defending a 75-yard one for a touchdown, and this means the Eskimos' defence would only have to come on the field in eight per cent of situations.

Of course, kicking the field goal wasn't a terrible option for Edmonton. It still gave them an excellent chance of winning, and forced Hamilton into a 75-yard drive without much time on the clock. It's just worth noting that their chances might have been boosted even further if they'd gone for the first down. That would have ended the game 91 per cent of the time, and the defence's situation in the other nine per cent would not have been significantly worse than it wound up being. Electing to kick the field goal (which itself wasn't a sure thing even from 15 yards, given that kicker Grant Shaw had missed two field goals already) ensured that Hamilton got the ball back and still had a chance to win, something that would have happened in less than 10 per cent of situations if the Eskimos had gone for it. It made for an exciting finish, but that doesn't necessarily mean it was the right call.

(Thanks to Rob Pettapiece for his help on the numbers here.)