Will the CFLPA's changes help avoid a repeat of the disastrous 2014 CBA talks?

Saturday's announcement of significant changes at the CFL Players' Association, including the replacement of long-time CFLPA lawyer Ed Molstad with the Toronto firm of Paliare Roland as well as the hiring of prominent advisors Ken Georgetti and Jock Climie, wasn't entirely unexpected given how poorly the union did in the 2014 CBA negotiations. These specific changes, or their timing (almost a year after those negotiations ended), weren't necessarily predictable, but it did seem likely that things were going to change at the CFLPA. The key question going forward is if these changes can help the union avoid another costly debacle in the next round of CBA negotiations in 2018.

The CFLPA was utterly disorganized and without a clear focus throughout the 2014 CBA negotiations, and they were outmaneuvered by the CFL at every turn. One part that really comes to mind is the way the league skillfully took their case to the public in May, releasing their proposed CBA and saying the CFLPA's proposal "would threaten the very existence of our league." That seemed to catch the union completely off guard, causing them to scramble and release their own proposed CBA, but it shouldn't have. Sports CBA negotiations in particular usually wind up with a substantial amount of public discussion, and getting fans on your side can be important (especially if it comes to a strike and/or lockout). Observing how things had gone in other leagues would have let the CFLPA prepare for a public debate and make it clear what they were fighting for.

Instead, the union sent mixed messages throughout the discussions, arguing for player-safety proposals and a cap tied to a percentage of revenue rather than a fixed cap, but ultimately backing off both of those grounds relatively easily. They couldn't keep players united throughout, leading to divides between long-term CFL players and those just looking to use the league as a quick path to the NFL. They also failed to send the required notice for a strike vote early enough, meaning that they couldn't effectively disrupt training camps or preseason games and gain leverage that way. That vote was eventually pointless, as the CFLPA went back to the bargaining table despite few meaningful concessions from the league beyond where things were when talks broke down in late May. Indeed, the CBA eventually agreed on had the same cap ceiling figures as the league's "best and final offer" that prompted the strike vote, and the players didn't win much in other areas, with their safety proposals also being rejected. Many players were highly upset with what their union agreed on, but they did vote to ratify it in the end. Everyone involved with the CFLPA should want the union to do much better in the next round of negotiations, though.

There were significant fundamental problems with how the CFLPA approached the 2014 negotiations. One in particular was their desire to have the cap tied to revenue. That could potentially be a great plan, as it's one that works very well in other leagues, and it would have averted the disastrous settlement that saw the percentage of money going to players league-wide jump by less than one per cent while revenues likely rose by over 21 per cent. (Those assumptions have since been largely backed by the data we've seen from Winnipeg's 2014 financials.) However, the CFLPA did a poor job of presenting why this was so essential and how it's worked in other leagues, and they didn't really talk about how miniscule the percentage of revenues they received under the old deal (or under the new deal) was, keeping them from easily winning popular support. They also backed off this "fundamental philosophical divide" quite easily, which is also a problem.

Even if the players had wound up with the same salary cap ceiling ($5 million in 2014, increasing slightly each year afterwards) under a revenue percentage system, they would have been better off. Consider Winnipeg again: the Bombers made $26,769,347 in revenue in 2014 and spent at most $5 million on salaries, 18.7 per cent of their total revenue (a long way from the 35 per cent the CFLPA once asked for). Even if you disregard the $3,587,931 they made in stadium management (presumably non-football) revenue, salaries only rise to 21.6 per cent of their revenue.

Yes, that percentage is probably bigger with the CFL's poorer teams, but it's also smaller with the league's top teams. For comparison, Saskatchewan made $43.8 million in gross pre-Grey Cup revenues in 2013, which would make a $5 million salary cap just 11.4 per cent of their revenues. They should have received even more revenue ($2.2 million) from the new TV deal in 2014, so they may be paying even less to players now. Those miniscule percentages would be better for the CFLPA than a fixed cap, though, because that would give the union more ammunition in the public debate and also give them better access to CFL financials, setting them up to negotiate more in 2018. Instead, they wound up with a pitifully low cap, and one that still doesn't accurately reflect league revenues. 

The key lesson of 2014 is that the CFLPA needs to be prepared and ready to fight a bargaining war with the league in public as well as in private. To get there, they need a consistent plan and consistent messaging. For example, their statement asking for 35 per cent of revenues (and excluding the high and low teams from that average) wasn't directly tied to their earlier request for a $6.24 million cap. To win the 2018 negotiations, the CFLPA needs to come forward with specific evidence that their proposals are anything but "something that would threaten the very existence of the league." Some of us on the outside have been making that case for them, exploring how little they received under the old deal, how little they get under the new deal, and how the CFL could probably afford to meet what they asked for, but it should be the CFLPA shouting that from the rooftops, not the media. Instead, the union bumbled from one tactic to another, didn't hold firm on any of their demands and wasn't even properly prepared to legally strike.

The 2014 debacle isn't necessarily all on departing consul Molstad (although the strike timing in particular raises questions about the legal advice the CFLPA got). The CFLPA was always in a difficult position, representing a widely-diverse group of players with significantly different goals, and doing so without the resources of bigger unions from other sports (which haven't done well as a group recently either, even if all of them have done better than the CFLPA). Blame here needs to go to the executives and to the player reps too for not having a clear vision, not being ready to fight a public war, not anticipating the CFL's tactics and not being able to keep their union unified. We'll see if that changes ahead of 2018. The addition of long-time labour leader Georgetti (and in a role specifically focused on the CBA) seems positive, as does the hire of the widely-respected Climie. In the end, though, the CFLPA will be judged on its results. The union did a dismal job on that front in 2014; we'll see if the new faces can change that by 2018.