East Coast Offense

Harrison and Bruschi knew how to be professionals on the field, but that doesn't mean they're good at expressing what they know or even describing how that sequence would really affect them. You see this with athletes turned commentators all the time - Joe Morgan was a sabermetric dream - getting on base, stealing at a high success rate, etc. but describes the game as if that stuff he was so good at doesn't matter. He just knew how to play the game right instinctively but didn't know why. So I think that what these guys says from the broadcast booth has to be taken skeptically... A thought occurs to Harrison, so he says it, but that might not be what he'd be thinking on the field. But my larger point is that I agree with you that psychological factors are huge in the NFL, but that the coach's job is to get the defense motivated generally (the coach's job is easier if Ray Lewis is on the team), and not have to alter the playcalling to do so. If your defense is going to be swayed by that, it's probably a lost cause already. The players need to trust that the coach has the team's best interests at heart and play hard for him. He will have to communicate well with them at times to reinforce that, but I think making it a play to play, series to series test is ridiculous. And thanks for the nice words about the column.

I'm actually on board with you in thinking that a defence with good morale does its job without coddling, but I don't think that any defence always has good morale. I also agree that any defence *ought* to believe in itself enough to play its professional best no matter what circumstances arise; I just don't think that they necessarily *do* in practice. I also think the very concepts of home field advantage, momentum, and clutch play are similar enigmatic psychological issues that shouldn't factor into game outcome at all if the players have mastered their own emotions. But all of these things do exist, affect the outcome of games, and have to be acknowledged to some degree. Otherwise we're looking at things as we think they should be as opposed to how they are.

Ray Lewis is never defeated and is perhaps a quintessential example of a zen master of applied sports psychology. He's a great case of a player who nudges the historical odds for any given situation in his defence's favour in comparison to the norm. And I should concede here in Belichick's defence that Brady does the same for the NE offence.

After starting a few days ago as ardently pro-punt (on this particular play), I'm drawing a bit closer to ambivalence on the decision (still give the edge to punting though). I have relied on Harrison and Bruschi to give me the idea that the Pats' D would be adversely affected by the call, but I don't know it for certain (though I'm giving them the benefit of the doubt). So I just hope Belichick at least considered that when he made the call rather than simply being rigidly unsentimental as many have said is his nature, because psychological elements exist regardless of the fact that they "shouldn't", and they're not visible in the odds.

Great article, btw.

It's true that there's no perfect precedent for that exact situation, and the probabilities are subject to debate. But most of the fourth and short data, combined with the chance of a game-winning drive after a punt leans toward going for it. There may be reasons to think that data shouldn't be applied in this instance, and that two of the greatest quarterbacks ever were involved might make the case for going for it even stronger. I'm persuaded by it even if the science isn't beyond question. And I do think the right argument against going is to challenge the data, not to take refuge in nfl precepts like "always punt from your own end with a lead on 4th down." Finally, you and I view defensive morale differently. In my view, a defense with good morale does its job when it's asked and doesn't need the coach to coddle its feelings by foregoing what he believes is the optimal decision. The defense ought to believe in itself enough to play its professional best no matter what circumstances it's asked to perform under. Do you think Ray Lewis would be defeated after NE gave up the ball, or would he up the intensity and do what he could to win? As I said defenses are routinely asked to force 3 and outs. Ne had 28 yards to work with. I'd expect them to do their job without any whining. That indy so easily carved them up only confirms that they were not the unit you wanted to put all your eggs in the basket with. Go with the hof qb first, give him a shot, and then the d can prove it's mettle afterward.

"There’s no formula that works in all cases, and deciding what’s relevant and what’s significant is more of an art than a science."

I think this statement should also be applied to the Bill Belichik coaching decision. It really isn't simply "a math problem", as you put it. Or perhaps you could say that it is a math problem, but the statistics used in the mathematical analysis are not necessarily taken from relevant sample sets. Those 60% and 53%/47% numbers had might as well be taken from 2006, as you put it. Or 1973 for that matter.

You might think that the defence's feelings are irrelevant in light of mathematical probability, but the fact here is that that defence has to go on the field after the failed 2-yard attempt and stop Peyton Manning from marching 30 yards in two minutes. Their mindset significantly affects the probability of success. I don't think the widely-quoted 47% WP for the Pats in those circumstances holds any water with a deflated D. That percentage for scoring from the 30-yard line was probably not generated from a sample set that contained many drives that started with a failed 4th-down conversion. And while it could be argued that the defence shouldn't be deflated at all, the fact that Harrison and Bruschi - being former players and presumably having a decent feel for the pulse of the typical NFL player - both felt that the call showed no confidence in the defence suggests that the defence would interpret it that was as well.

Rallying the troops is often a more important element of leadership than playing favorable historical numbers.

I've enjoyed reading people's takes on the Belichik call; it's intruiging on so many different levels. I wish NFL coaches would put their cajones on the line and do more of what Belichik did, the game would become more interesting from a strategy perspective.

I think it was earlier this season I was reading an article on SI about a high school coach who almost never allowed his team to punt on 4th down. The historical data he had from previous games proved it was the right thing to do in most situations. You have to admire those minds that zig instead of zag and break free from the conventional mold...using solid statistics. Listening TV analysts? ;)

As for survivor this week, I was happy to see I had my Pitts share still available, I'll use them. After Pitts, NE and Cincy, my well is getting mighty dry...

I love Calvin Johnson, and have always been a big supporter, but I don't know about those trades straight up. The only one I would consider would be DeSean just because McNabb spreads the ball around as Brees does. Thomas Jones is top 10 and will remain that way if healthy, because there is no Leon threat to his touches, and Rex loves to run as we have seen in b-more. Roddy White, will still remain a top 10 WR because Matt Ryan loves him. So Trading a top 10 WR for someone who MIGHT have a good late run, seems like youre putting your whole fantasy playoff run on chance rather than proven production. It's all about opportunity cost, and this year I am not gambling on Johnson.

As I said, nine games isn't enough to evaluate the deal, but Cutler's no rookie. He's in his fourth season. Manning threw 28 picks his rookie year because he was a full time starter out of the gate for a terrible team. Cutler didn't start until the latter part of his rookie year, so it's apples to oranges. And bringing Manning at all sets the bar way too high for Cutler. But 7.0 is about league average, and when you factor in the picks, he's been a bust so far. I know he's got bad receivers, but a great QB makes those guys better. I still think the jury's out, but the early returns have been underwhelming.

Point taken. I just think that sometimes conventional wisdom is the smarter approach. In fact, most of the time it is. That's why it's considered conventional wisdom in the first place - it's proven successful more times than not over time. Believe me, I'm all for taking chances and breaking from the norm, but in this case, we'll just have to agree to disagree.

Good stuff Chris. Always enjoy the read.

P

You must be out of your mind to think that the Bears would consider a redo on the trade for Jay Cutler. Although he is averaging 7.0 YPA, Peyton Manning is averaging 8.0 per attempt. So let's look past the interceptions and actually watch a Bear game to see that Cutler has no offensive line and no running game whatsoever. Oh and by the way, his number one receiver is Devin Hester, a man who people have been saying since day one that he is not a legitimate number one receiver, and has not proven he is. So give me break, Jay Cutler is the future of the Bears.

And everyone who reads this, do yourself a favor and see how many interceptions Peyton Manning threw in his first 5 years in the league, I'm sure you'll be pleasantly surprised.

Paul B, I would have praised and defended any coach who went for it with those players in that situation. Period. And you're right - if Belichick had punted, and Manning drove down the field, no one would have said @#$%. But don't infer that that's because it was right. It's because it's the conventional wisdom. In that case he would have followed the unwritten rule which is to fear the disaster that takes place on one play rather than the disaster that takes place over many, even if the former gives you better odds. But to me, whether someone follows the unwritten rule or not, is the incorrect framing of the issue. The correct framing is as a probability question - a math problem. Same with the MJD decision - it's not a question of "never take points off the board" or any other unwritten rule of coaching. It's just a math problem. And like Belichick MJD got the math right. Is NFL decision making science or religion? If you believe in commandments ("never take points off the board", "always punt from your own end," it's religion. You believe it because the elders have said it were so. If it's science, you look at the historical data, the game situation and the quality of the players, and you crunch the numbers. For matters of NFL decision-making I'll usually pick the science - unless I have a hunch that the science is suspect.

If going for it on 4th and 2 from your own 28 is the right call every time (in that situation), independent of the outcome, how then do we label Bellichick if he had punted there, stopped Indy, and won the game? Are we bashing him? Are we calling him conservative? Do we strip him of his genius label? Is he a eunuch? No, we're all -- and I mean ALL -- giving him kudos for winning the game and the issue of punting or going for it isn't even discussed. Why? Because it's what he was supposed to do. Now, if he punts there and Indy still scores to win the game, is there anybody screaming that he should've went for it instead? I seriously doubt that. Instead, everybody credits Peyton Manning and the Colts offense on a great comeback, the Pats defense is to blame, and Bill Bellichick walks away with his nether regions intact.

Look, I hear the argument for the percentages and the math, but let's be honest, if this were Norv Turner or Tom Cable, the same people supporting Bellichick would have thrown the percentages out the window. We're giving him the benefit of the doubt in this instance only because he's been successful in the past. If the decision to go for it is right each and every time (again, under those circumstances), it shouldn't matter who's making the call. In short, I don't think it was a wise decision. Was it ballsy? Of course it was. But that doesn't make it the right call in my opinion.

I'm more peeved by the bad decision to have MJD pull up short of the end zone. That was a 100 percent chance of a score right there, clock be damned. It's like taking points off the board. You have the six points in your pocket and yet you give them up because you assume the three are a given? I don't get it. What if the snap is botched on the FG, the kicker slips, the kick is blocked, or god forbid...the kicker shanks it? I understand the Westbrook scenario where you're winning the game and pull up short to let the clock expire. But when you're losing the game? This isn't an instance of "going for it". That score was in the books if MJD doesn't purposely go down at the one. They essentially traded a guaranteed seven points for a non-guaranteed three. I disagree with that move wholeheartedly.

Chris, this is consistently the most insightful column I read all week. Thanks for the analysis you do and for treating your readers with a high level of respect in delivering it. So much of what passes for fantasy analysis falls right in the category of Jauron's decision making. It's refreshing to read someone that's willing to take a different perspective.

Haha, I knew there was a reason I enjoy Liss' articles the most...

Now if only Calvin Johnson would do his part, we could all be happy!

post# 16: "Why can't people comprehend two different ideas in one paragraph?"

Maybe if you had been clearer there wouldn't have been the discussion about what you meant. You can use correct grammar and still be confusing, why can't analysts comprehend that? :)

That would have been ever crazier and even better - first play, let the Colts score, get the ball back with two minutes. Belichick would have taken 10 times more heat for that, but it would have been brilliant. And they probably should have let Addai score. The only issue is that teams do make goal-line stands, so it's a tougher call up six. If you're up two, it's a no brainer to let him score. The question is what the optimal balance is between the chance for a stop and leaving enough time in the event of a score. You want to give yourself the chance for a stop, but if it fails have it fail quickly. I'd say blitz nine guys on every play, sell out for the sack/turnover or TD against.

And I probably should have used the word: "However". Sorry for the confusion in the first part, though in the second part - who you should deal for Johnson, that is the proper syntax. And no doubt, you could criticize Belichick's TO call or the conservative play calling before that. He's not perfect. But he was right to go for it on 4th down.

I won't claim to be the only person who has thought of this, but after failing to complete the 4th down, BB was faced with having to stop Peyton Manning from going 28 yards in two minutes with zero timeouts. Do you think it crossed BB's mind to simply "let" the Colts score as quickly as possible? I mean, without making it look like he's simply conceding the TD, let the Colts score in 20 or 30 seconds, thus putting the ball back in Brady's hands to go maybe 50 yards downfield (assuming the Pats get the kickoff on their 20 and have to reach the Colts' 30 for a 47-yard field goal) with at least a minute left on the clock? When one of the Pats defensive players had the shoe-string tackle of Addai at the goalline, that put the final nail in the coffin. "Let" Addai score, and Brady & pals get to take probably 4 or 5 shots to get halfway into Colts' territory.

I gave up MSW + Donald Brown for Calvin Johnson. Didn't want to give up Brown, but Calvin is a top-5 talent, regardless of QB.

Steve Young brought up a really good point earlier today regarding the 4th and 2 decision. It wasn't really the decision to go for it on 4th and 2 that was bad, it was the timeout before that was. Going for it on 4th is actually a great move if you do it in-game, but once you call a timeout and allow the defense to match-up, then your chances of getting the first down go down significantly.

I know that Belichick wanted the timeout to get his offense all on the same page, but by doing so he lost the element of surprise, which is the biggest advantage an offense has on a 4th down play.

NJ, I think you're right about the 60 percent 4th and 2 - that sounded too high to me, too. If that were the case, the PAT would be obsolete - everyone would go for two. But even so, I think the call was right - the 4th down play ate into the two-minute warning, I believe, so it was just one timeout. That would leave about 15-20 seconds after a punt. It was game over. And even when the Pats didn't get it, they would have had a chance to score a GW FG if the Colts had scored too quickly (which they might have if Addai had gotten in). My numbers: 50 percent to convert on 4th and 2, 30 percent to stop them after the conversion failed (they needed to go 28 yards - which means 2-3 first downs, and limited time). So 50 + 30 percent of 50 = 65. If they punt, it's basically 50/50 at best that they stop Peyton in that situation. So 65/50 in favor of going for it is my rough calculation. But either way, at least you're disagreeing on the numbers which is more than those clowns on NBC did.

LOL who's the tool now norrisou?

I just traded Sims-Walker for Johnson...I'm feeling pretty good about that one going forward. Good column Liss. Couldn't agree more about your Belichick take. Why should he have put his defense back on the field to face 3 future HOFers in Manning, Wayne and Clark when he could (and did) put the game in the hands of Tom Brady? Really not that hard to figure out.

Thank you Bartolo - I couldn't have put it better. My point was simply that while the injury was mostly to blame for Johnson's disappointing season, I didn't think Stafford would be such a downgrade over the stiffs they had last year. STILL, I would gamble on Johnson the rest of the way by trading any of those solid players who would very likely fetch Johnson from an owner who had soured on him. Why can't people comprehend two different ideas in one paragraph? (1) Stafford's been a bad QB for him so far and (2) I'd still buy him going forward. And Erik, Mayo et. al. were not robbed of their chance - they blew it when the Colts got the ball back and showed why they were not to be trusted.

That's fine, hopefully he can clear that up for you.

Re-reading his sentences, the word STILL jumps out at me.

Perhaps its because I agree with his 'implied' statement that Calvin will be more productive than those 3 players listed. And that's really the point of all of this anyways. Finding guys to trade for, who's value YOU believe will increase, that other people don't believe in as strongly (you know, so they will actually trade them to you at a discount).

I think you mean "infer" what he meant.

No you're the tool...blah blah.

You're acting like you're a superior being because you can imply what he meant. He said he was bad and then he said to trade for him. Whether or not he meant to say it that way isn't the point. You don't know what he meant and only a "tool" would imply that they do. Maybe he meant that you should trade Johnson for those 3 guys. Had he put the word "however" in there, the meaning of it changes. It has nothing to do with whether or not we have the brain capacity to understand fantasy football advice.

We're questioning a contradiction in his article. Leave it to HIM to clarify what HE meant.

Nice column Liss, I absolutely agree that 'hurting the defense's feelings' is a ridiculous argument. It is a math (EV or probability) problem. However, I'm not convinced reading Posnanski's or other columns that the math was clearly in Belichick's favor either. Several points: 1) It was assumed that if the Pat's got first down, they had a 100% chance of winning the game. However, with Indy having 1 timeout and the two minute warning, that is not necessarily true. It's a long shot for sure, but I would still give Indy at least a 5% chance of winning (if not more) based on possible fumbles, blocked or messed up punts, long punt return, etc. And manning would still get the ball (considering they stopped them next three plays) with at least 30 seconds left. Secondly, the statistic of NFL teams converting 4th and 2 60% of the time, I am pretty sure that is actually of converting 4th and 2 or less which is extremely different. Do you know Liss? But that brings on the last point, that historical, league-wide data is not the correct estimation of probability. You can use it as a benchmark, but when calculating EV or probability you must make your best estimate of your specific offense converting against this specific defense at this point in the game. So I can go with close to 55% (or 60% max) for Brady to get it done, but using that logic we have to give Payton much higher then the league average chance of scoring the touchdown from either the 28 or after the punt. So the real crucial question becomes how much harder would it be for Manning to score with a long field than short field, and I really don't have a good number for that. Regardless, I think the numbers are very close, I would even lead towards punting being the correct call mathematically. But I still really appreciate that Belichick will consider the alternative rather than just punting because you are supposed to.